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Abstract
Employment discrimination claimants in general, and racial minority claimants in particular, disproportionately lack access
to legal counsel. When employment discrimination claimants lack counsel, they typically abandon their claims, or if they
pursue their claims, they do so pro se (without counsel), a strategy that is seldom successful in court. Access to counsel is,
hence, a decisive component in whether employment discrimination victims realize the potential of civil rights enforcement.
Psychological science analyzes access to counsel by identifying psychological barriers—such as threatened social identity,
mistrust in legal authorities, and fear of repercussions—that prevent employment discrimination victims from pursuing
counsel. The analysis also identifies how cultural beliefs and practices concerning justice—such as meritocracy beliefs,
perceived post-racialism, and organizational diversity initiatives—shape how judges, jurors, and lay people think about
discrimination. Furthermore, counsels’ perceptions of other’s beliefs about discrimination shape their assessed likelihood
of prevailing. These psychological barriers intersect with structural barriers to shape counsels’ evaluation of each case’s
likely financial viability, which can prevent counsel from accepting cases that they otherwise deem meritorious. Policy can
help those who experience employment discrimination obtain legal representation and meaningful redress for civil rights
violations.
Keywords
employment discrimination, discrimination claims, legal representation, social justice, legitimacy, civil rights, postracial,
diversity, racial disparity, psychology and law

Tweet
Psychological science on claiming discrimination identifies
opportunities to improve the promise of civil rights
enforcement.

Key Points
•• Employment discrimination claimants have difficulty
obtaining legal representation.
•• Legal representation is critical for receiving meaningful redress for civil rights violations.
•• Psychological processes and structural barriers combine to diminish discrimination claimants’ access to
counsel.
•• This analysis identifies how to improve the promise of
civil rights enforcement.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to
guide victims of employment discrimination toward accessing their rights. Despite the significant strides made in access
to workplace civil rights in the ensuing 50 years, the promise
of Title VII remains largely unfulfilled for many victims of
employment discrimination. This article explores psychological science on claiming discrimination, examining the
barriers that prevent victims of employment discrimination
from achieving meaningful redress and access to justice. We
focus on the process of obtaining legal representation.
Accessing counsel is critical in the dispute pyramid, which
largely dictates whether a claimant will vindicate unlawful
discrimination, and as yet, is underexplored by psychological inquiry.

1

Introduction
This year, the United States marks the 50th anniversary of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII of this act outlawed
many forms of employment discrimination and created the
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Dispute Pyramid
Analyzing how experiences of discrimination become legal
cases, Miller and Sarat’s (1980) Pyramid of Disputes highlights where grievances fall out of the legal system (Galanter,
1983). Grievances reside at the pyramid’s broadest point, the
base. Grievances are convictions of being unjustly treated.
When individuals experience a grievance, they can scale up
to the next level of the pyramid by making a claim for redress
or they can fall from the pyramid by choosing not to pursue
the grievance. Claims can be either accepted as legitimate by
the other party (and the claimant receives redress) or they
can be contested, and move up another level in the pyramid
to become a dispute. The claimant can then choose either to
abandon the dispute or to bring it to a lawyer. If the lawyer
chooses to represent the claimant, the dispute ascends the
pyramid. If the lawyer turns down the case, the dispute typically falls off the pyramid, or it can remain, but as a pro se
case, whereby the claimant forgoes counsel.
Compared with other kinds of grievances, discriminationrelated grievances have steep attrition from the pyramid, disproportionately falling out of the legal system at all levels of
the pyramid (Miller & Sarat, 1980). Another dispute pyramid
analysis reached a similar conclusion, estimating that only
1% of African Americans’ discrimination-related grievances
ultimately become lawsuits (Nielsen & Nelson, 2005). To be
sure, the dispute pyramid is steeper for discrimination-related
grievances than other grievances, but why?
Psychological science has focused almost exclusively on
the grievance and claim stages of the dispute pyramid, identifying psychological barriers that prevent people from perceiving and asserting discrimination-related grievances
(Kaiser & Major, 2006; Major & Kaiser, 2005). Here, we
investigate the psychology of what happens after victims
perceive and publicly assert discrimination-related grievances and then attempt to obtain legal counsel. Specifically,
discrimination claimants are disproportionately likely to end
up without legal counsel, so we examine why this occurs.
Given that individuals who file pro se legal cases fare far
worse than counseled claimants (Berger, Finkelstein, &
Cheung, 2005; Miller & Sarat, 1980; Quintanilla, 2011), this
lack of legal representation poses an access-to-justice problem, preventing discrimination claimants from ascending the
pyramid of disputes and obtaining meaningful redress for
civil rights violations (Nielsen, Nelson, & Lancaster, 2010).

Plaintiffs’ Counsel as Civil Rights
Gatekeepers
To obtain legal representation, an individual must convince a
lawyer that the case is legitimate and that legal decision makers will perceive the case as meritorious. Many who cannot
obtain representation exit the dispute pyramid without meaningful redress. Yet, a fraction forges ahead and files a case pro
se. Analyses of 25 years of federal employment discrimination
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cases reveal that compared with other disputes, many employment discrimination plaintiffs file legal cases without legal
representation (20%), as pro se plaintiffs (Myrick, Nelson, &
Nielsen, 2012). Although the Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts reports that the uncounseled rate in U.S. federal district
courts across all civil cases (excluding prisoner petitions) is
10.9%, our own review of federal employment discrimination
cases within Bloomberg Law’s database reveals that of the
12,619 employment discrimination cases filed in 2013, 24.1%
were filed pro se. Furthermore, pro se status shows racial disparities, with African Americans, Hispanic Americans, and
Asian Americans less likely than Whites to obtain representation (Myrick et al., 2012). These disparities persist even controlling for plaintiffs’ occupational status, gender, age, type of
discrimination, and EEOC assessment of the case’s strength
(Myrick et al., 2012). Thus, the very groups most likely to
experience discrimination are least likely to receive legal representation, a structural impediment within our system of civil
rights protections that operates against those most in need of
equal employment opportunity.
Both the high rate of pro se representation in discrimination cases and the racial disparities in pro se filing pose an
access-to-justice problem. Among claimants who reach dispositive motion litigation stages, those who advance pro se
almost invariably lose (Berger et al., 2005; Nielsen et al.,
2010; Quintanilla, 2011). As such, plaintiffs’ lawyers are
civil rights gatekeepers who control meaningful access to the
rights and remedies that the law provides (Albiston &
Nielsen, 2006).
This article offers a three-stage analysis, examining how
psychological factors related to employment-discrimination
victims, lawyers, and their interaction shape legal representation outcomes. The three stages involve the following: (a)
the employment-discrimination claimant’s decision to seek
counsel; (b) counsel’s initial assessment of the potential client’s claim; and (c) counsel’s assessment of whether others
(e.g., judges, juries, defense counsel) will deem the claim
meritorious, coupled with an evaluation of the claim’s financial viability. The analysis highlights how psychological processes shape discrimination claimants’ experiences with the
legal system and lawyers’ decisions about whether to represent them. The analysis also connects legal decisions to
structural factors and underlying psychological processes,
considering law and policy relevant to increasing the likelihood that those who face unlawful discrimination will obtain
legal representation and, in turn, meaningful redress.

Stage I: Pursuing Counsel
After navigating organizational dispute procedures and federal channels, those aggrieved by unlawful discrimination
are responsible for identifying counsel to consider their case.
Yet, this is when a significant proportion of employment discrimination cases fall from the dispute pyramid (Nielsen &
Nelson, 2005). Why would people who acknowledged
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discrimination within their organization or received a
Notification of the Right to Sue Letter from the EEOC be
reluctant to speak with a lawyer?

Psychological Barriers
Costs of claiming discrimination. Some claimants may hesitate
to confer with counsel because of the interpersonal costs of
claiming discrimination. Although most people believe that
they will speak up when they experience discrimination, in
fact, few do (Shelton & Stewart, 2004; Swim & Hyers, 1999;
Woodzicka & LaFrance, 2001). Victims report being reluctant to speak about their experiences of discrimination
because they anticipate that others will react negatively (Kaiser & Miller, 2004). These concerns are understandable, as
members of high-status groups often do respond negatively
toward those claiming discrimination, even when claims are
warranted (Kaiser, Dyrenforth, & Hagiwara, 2006; Kaiser &
Miller, 2001; Shelton & Stewart, 2004).
For example, in one experiment (Kaiser & Miller, 2003),
White participants viewed the job application of an African
American man who was denied employment. Some participants saw that the hiring manager made extremely racist
remarks (e.g., that African Americans are unintelligent and
that he would never hire an African American), and others
saw statements that were either subtly racist or race neutral.
When the job applicant blamed his adverse outcome on racism, Whites perceived him as a troublemaker, compared with
when he blamed his experience on other causes. This negative
reaction occurred even given the employer’s blatant racism.
Interpersonal costs from asserting discrimination are
likely a barrier to seeking counsel. Even if victims overcome
the obstacles of filing an internal grievance and an EEOC
charge, recruiting counsel greatly amplifies the potential
costs of claiming discrimination, as any lawsuit becomes
public and the claimant’s credibility becomes central to
deciding the merits of a case. Anticipating these interpersonal costs (from defense attorneys, juries, judges, media,
coworkers) may make victims’ discrimination forgo seeking
counsel, abandoning their claims.
Trust in legal authorities. The decision to seek counsel may
also be shaped by expectations of how fairly one anticipates
being treated by the legal system (Tyler, 2006). If people
anticipate encountering unfair legal procedures, they are less
likely to turn to the legal system to resolve their grievances.
Victims of employment discrimination need to believe that
they will experience procedural fairness (Tyler, 2006)—
treatment as procedurally fair as the employer they are
suing—and that the court will behave unbiasedly toward
them. For some disadvantaged groups, their long-standing
history of mistreatment and disenfranchisement in the legal
system undermines faith in the fairness of the legal system
(Tyler, 2006). This may cause them to abandon their claims,

or to exert more personal control over their predicament by
forgoing counsel and representing themselves.

Structural Barriers
Besides psychological barriers, structural barriers dampen
and prevent seeking counsel. First, because discrimination
claimants are overrepresented among society’s marginalized segments, they may have fewer resources to retain a
lawyer, or to absorb lawyers’ fees should they lose, and
might instead choose to pursue cases as pro se plaintiffs or
to abandon their claims (Myrick et al., 2012). Second,
because people tend to live and work with others of the
same social class, many victims of discrimination may not
have social networks that connect to sympathetic lawyers,
offering fewer opportunities to obtain legal representation
(Myrick et al., 2012). Last, claimants from society’s margins unduly lack the access, ability, and means to identify
and hire counsel.

Stage II: Gaining Credibility in the Eyes
of Plaintiffs’ Counsel
If employment discrimination claimants pass these psychological and structural barriers to seeking counsel, they then
describe their experiences to plaintiffs’ counsel, who considers the credibility of their account. Here, psychological processes that characterize potential client–lawyer discussions
about discrimination can affect initial assessment of the
potential client’s credibility.

Psychological Barriers
Social identity threat. Discussing experiences of discrimination is stressful, especially when the conversation occurs
between individuals whose groups differ in social status
(Richeson & Shelton, 2007). Such discussions can lead to a
predicament known as “social identity threat,” the concern
with being viewed through the lens of stereotypes or being
devalued because of group membership (Steele, Spencer, &
Aronson, 2002). As much research reveals, social identity
threat results in anxiety, stress, and physiological arousal
(Major & O’Brien, 2005). Social identity related stress harms
its targets, undermining test performance, decision making,
and behavior regulation (Major & O’Brien, 2005; Richeson
& Shelton, 2007; Steele et al., 2002).
Social identity threat may impair the initial screening
meetings between employment-discrimination victims and
lawyers. When disenfranchised potential clients (e.g.,
minority, elderly, female, disabled, or an immigrant) communicate with lawyers (often from higher social status),
they are vulnerable to social identity threat. Social identity
threat may occur even if the lawyer harbors no animosity
toward the client: Simply discussing one’s experience with
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discrimination could induce this threat (Richeson &
Shelton, 2007).
When a potential client experiences social identity
threat, the resulting physiological arousal and taxed cognitive capacities may affect their ability to communicate
clearly with a lawyer. They may, for example, disclose less,
speak more awkwardly, respond less effectively to questions, avoid eye contact, or otherwise behave anxiously
(Burgess, Warren, Phelan, Dovidio, & Van Ryn, 2010).
Thus, social identity threat may challenge potential clients’
ability to discuss their experiences confidently and credibly. When this process unfolds, lawyers may find clients’
accounts of discrimination insufficiently compelling, and
the conversations may weaken interpersonal rapport. This
psychological phenomenon may hinder discrimination
cases, and in particular, racial minorities’ cases, from
ascending the pyramid of disputes.
Fortunately, the potential for social identity threat in
client–lawyer interactions can be remedied. Lawyers could
be educated about how social identity threat can impair
performance in intergroup interactions and could become
more aware that awkward behavior or weak rapport may
stem in part from social identity threat, rather than from
credibility issues with the potential client’s case. Legal
education could draw on identity-safety research, which
shows that potentially threatening contexts can improve
when they convey valuing disadvantaged groups (Steele
et al., 2002). For example, lawyers’ office space can highlight past success representing disadvantaged clients, or
present service to minority-advocacy groups. Furthermore,
increased diversity of the legal profession can result in
more lawyers from similar backgrounds to many discrimination claimants, increasing claimants’ comfort with discussing discrimination. These welcoming environments
relax discrimination claimants, improving communication
with lawyers.

Structural Barriers
Structural barriers also impede employment-discrimination
victims from convincing attorneys that their cases are credible. As discrimination claimants often come from disadvantaged backgrounds, they may have insufficient status
within an organization to access information about the history of their group’s treatment within the organization. This
could undermine gathering evidence about potential discrimination and result in furnishing lawyers with less convincing evidence. In addition, clients from disadvantaged
backgrounds might have few personal connections to legal
professionals in their everyday social networks, and they
may lack advice on how to hunt for compelling evidence of
discrimination (e.g., requesting personnel documents,
maintaining a detailed journal about discriminatory
experiences).
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Stage III: Counsel’s Projection of Legal
Merit and Financial Viability
For employment discrimination claimants who do convince
a lawyer that their case is credible, the next obstacle in
ascending the pyramid of disputes involves the lawyer projecting the case’s legal merit, as well as its financial viability.
Because only successful litigation mainly compensates lawyers, their willingness to represent the claimant must assess
both likelihood of establishing liability and winning monetary recovery (Farhang & Spencer, 2014). Lawyers derive
these judgments by predicting how others—juries, judges,
and defense attorneys—will react to the case, that is, whether
they will find the claims credible and the victim worthy of
legal redress. This process involves “meta-perceptions,”
inferences about how others will perceive the claimant and
the case (Laing, Phillipson, & Lee, 1966). Lawyers’ metaperceptions may derive partly from widespread beliefs that
shape how both everyday people and legal thinkers understand discrimination. Plaintiffs’ counsel is in a precarious
position when drawing meta-perceptions because many
powerful cultural beliefs inhibit legal decision makers and
lay people from perceiving discrimination directed against
disadvantaged groups. These shared but inaccurate beliefs
can pose barriers to successfully litigating discrimination
cases, perhaps leading lawyers to decline cases that they otherwise see as legitimate.

Psychological Barriers
Meritocracy beliefs. Discrimination claims occur in the context of shared beliefs that the United States is a meritocracy:
a place where anyone, irrespective of background and circumstances, can get ahead through hard work, determination, and talent (Kaiser & Major, 2006). The more strongly
individuals endorse meritocracy, or the more the situation
makes those beliefs salient, the less likely they are to detect
discrimination against members of disadvantaged groups,
such as minorities and women (Major, Quinton, & McCoy,
2002). Furthermore, the more people endorse meritocracy,
the more they derogate minorities who air discrimination
grievances (Kaiser et al., 2006; Schultz & Maddox, 2013).
Discrimination against minorities threatens a core meritocracy belief that anyone in the United States can succeed if he
or she simply works hard enough. Rather than abandoning
meritocracy beliefs, people often preserve them by denying
discrimination and rejecting those who challenge their
beliefs (Kaiser & Major, 2006).
Faced with this cultural backdrop about meritocracy,
plaintiffs’ counsel may experience a dilemma between their
personal conviction that a potential client experienced discrimination and their meta-perception of how others will
view the case. Thus, they may decline cases that they personally deem credible. They may instead selectively choose
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cases that are likely to overcome cultural perceptions that the
workplace is a meritocracy. For example, they may be more
willing to pursue collective cases that involve an aggrieved
class of claimants (Nielsen et al., 2010), rather than a single
individual: Attributing a single person’s misfortune to lack of
merit is easier than doing so for an entire class of aggrieved
people (Crosby, Clayton, Alksnis, & Hemker, 1986).
Post-racialism. Discrimination claims also occur in the context of a cultural belief that the United States has achieved a
phase of post-racialism, a period in which racism no longer
poses serious problems for minorities (Norton & Sommers,
2011). When people perceive the United States as post-racial,
minorities’ discrimination claims appear less credible, and
people question whether efforts to address discrimination are
still necessary (Kaiser, Drury, Spalding, Cheryan, & O’Brien,
2009; Plaut, 2011). Post-racialism allows meritocracy beliefs
to flourish, as this climate communicates that past barriers no
longer remain.
Furthermore, post-racialism beliefs shape which groups
seem most affected by discrimination (Wilkins & Kaiser,
2014). For example, recent U.S. Supreme Court cases dismissing both affirmative action and disparate impact theory
cited a substantial decline in the racism faced by disadvantaged groups (Grutter v. Bollinger, 2003; Ricci v. DeStefano,
2009; Fisher v. University of Texas, 2013). At the same time,
they characterized efforts to address remaining societal racism against minority groups as deliberate “reverse discrimination” against Whites. Over time, these cultural shifts have
resulted in many Whites now perceiving that Whites, rather
than minorities, are more likely to be the targets of race discrimination (Norton & Sommers, 2011).
The cultural climate of post-racialism poses a barrier for
plaintiffs’ counsel. If judges and juries now believe that racism against disadvantaged groups is disappearing, plaintiffs’
counsel will have greater difficulty convincing them that
minority clients’ cases are credible. Indeed, a recent analysis
of judges’ summary judgment decisions in federal discrimination cases revealed that Black claimants’ race discrimination claims were more likely to be dismissed than those of
White claimants, and that the race of the judge exacerbates
this effect (Nielsen et al., 2010; Weinberg & Nielsen, 2011).
A similar pattern emerges at the motion-to-dismiss stage,
under the new pleading standard that instructs judges to draw
on their own experience and common sense when screening
cases (Quintanilla, 2011). These patterns may emerge
because judges’ intuitions are shaped by participating in a
culture that believes it has become post-racial.
Ironically, beliefs in post-racialism might make it easier
for some types of discrimination claimants to be viewed as
credible. To the extent that Whites now view Whites as the
primary targets of discrimination (Norton & Sommers,
2011), plaintiffs’ counsel might anticipate that these cases
will be perceived more favorably by legal decision makers,
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and “reverse discrimination” claimants may more easily
recruit lawyers (Myrick et al., 2012).
Organizational diversity initiatives. Defendants’ lawyers may
mount a defense highlighting organizational diversity initiatives as evidence of nondiscrimination, and this may shape
plaintiffs’ counsel’s meta-perceptions. Diversity initiatives
promoting egalitarian values (e.g., pro-diversity mission
statements, diversity training) are prevalent in U.S. organizations (Dobbin, 2009). Despite their prevalence, most diversity initiatives do not result in fairer organizational outcomes
for disadvantaged groups (Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006).
Instead, many diversity initiatives serve only as symbolic
markers of fairness (Dobbin, 2009). Ironically, however,
research in law and psychology has observed that diversity
initiatives, even those that are purely window dressing,
impede detecting discrimination against members of disadvantaged groups (Edelman, Krieger, Eliason, Albiston, &
Mellema, 2011; Kaiser et al., 2013).
For example, in recent decades, federal judges have
increasingly displayed deference to organizations’ diversity
initiatives when deciding employment discrimination cases
(Edelman et al., 2011). Increasingly, judges conclude that
merely possessing diversity initiatives makes organizations
compliant with civil rights laws, without evaluating whether
these initiatives actually create fairer environments. U.S.
Supreme Court decisions also reveal judicial deference. In
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton (1998), the Court absolved
organizations of responsibility for employees’ meritorious
charge of sexual harassment when employees are aware of
an organization’s diversity initiative but do not navigate its
internal dispute process. Yet, these rulings do not require that
organizations show that their diversity initiatives are actually
effective at protecting civil rights.
Psychological science also reveals that people assume
organizations with diversity initiatives are unlikely to discriminate, even when faced with evidence that discrimination occurred. Across six experiments (Kaiser et al., 2013),
the presence (vs. absence) of organizational diversity initiatives (e.g., diversity training, diversity mission statement)
caused advantaged groups (e.g., Whites, men) to become less
sensitive to discrimination directed at disadvantaged groups
(racial minorities, women). For example, after seeing women
disproportionately passed over for promotions in favor of
equally qualified men, men told that the company offered
gender-related diversity training were less likely to see disparate treatment against women as stemming from sexism,
compared with men who did not see evidence of diversity
training. Sometimes, even disadvantaged groups show these
same responses to diversity initiatives. For example, women
are less likely to detect sexism against women when an organization offers gender-related diversity training, compared
with when it does not (Brady, Kaiser, Major, & Kirby, 2014;
see Dover, Major, & Kaiser, 2014, for data on Latinos).
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Studies from law and psychology converge to suggest
that defense attorneys who introduce evidence that an organization offers diversity initiatives will inhibit juries and
judges from detecting discrimination against disadvantaged
groups. Plaintiffs’ counsel might be constrained by this
“diversity defense,” making it more difficult to demonstrate
the merits of their case. In the face of this, plaintiffs’ counsel may decline credible cases involving disadvantaged
clients.

Structural Barriers
Beyond psychological processes, several structural barriers
block meaningful redress of potentially meritorious discrimination claims and dampen their financial viability. Adequate
compensation is the “fuel that makes the machinery of adjudication work. If the fuel runs out, the machinery does not
function and civil rights do not have the effect of protecting
people whose interests are at stake” (Civil Rights Act, 1990,
House Report).
Over recent decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has raised
substantive, procedural, and fee-recovery barriers that
dampen the financial viability of representing discrimination claimants, which Congress has attempted with incomplete success to dislodge. In 1975, the Court forbade federal
courts from exercising equitable powers to provide fee
awards to prevailing civil rights claimants. One year later,
Congress responded by enacting a statute authorizing fee
shifting, the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act. In
1989 and 1990, the Court issued seven decisions that curtailed Title VII’s private enforcement regime, reshaping
burdens of proof, standards of evidence, standing, statute of
limitations, and attorneys’ fees. In turn, Congress responded
by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which attempted
to restore Title VII’s private enforcement regime (Civil
Rights Act, 1990, House Report; Civil Rights Act, 1990,
Senate Report). Afterward, the Court imposed severely
restrictive time periods for claimants to challenge equal pay
discrimination (Brake & Grossman, 2007), which Congress
unwound in the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. Since the
early 1990s, the Court has also reshaped Title VII’s proof
structures, narrowing the legal contours of actionable discrimination, harassment, and retaliation (Brake &
Grossman, 2007; Nelson, Berrey, & Nielsen, 2008). And
the Court has reinterpreted procedural rules, including
pleading rules, making Title VII cases more difficult to
commence (Quintanilla, 2011), while dampening the ability to redress discrimination on a class-wide basis (Resnik,
2011), and diminishing the likelihood of collecting attorneys’ fees when lawsuits force defendants to voluntarily
halt discrimination (Albiston & Nielsen, 2006). The cumulative effect of these structural barriers disincentivizes lawyers from representing victims of discrimination and
contributes to the access-to-justice problem.
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Policy Implications
Our three-stage analysis of obtaining legal representation
highlights the psychological and structural barriers that prevent employment discrimination claimants from obtaining
legal representation and scaling the dispute pyramid.
Surmounting these barriers can strengthen civil rights
enforcement, providing employment-discrimination victims
with the meaningful redress promised in Title VII. This final
section connects psychological science, law, and policy,
offering suggestions for increasing discrimination claimants’
access to counsel.
First, psychological scientists can contribute toward legal
education by providing guidance on framing arguments in
ways that increase jurors’ and judges’ receptivity toward evidence that discrimination continues to pose barriers for disadvantaged groups. Doing this may help lawyers overcome
barriers posed by meta-perceptions of judges, juries, and
defense attorneys that prevent them from taking on discrimination cases. However, legal education may be insufficient,
as financial realities constrain representation decisions.
Instead, public interest law can provide a powerful path
toward overcoming some obstacles to representation highlighted here. For example, with increased public funding for
legal services and to agencies such as the EEOC, public service lawyers could accept risky cases. They could introduce
arguments that overcome the obstacles described, and if successful, could provide precedent for other employment discrimination cases. If these cases are successful, private
lawyers may be more willing to take on subsequent cases,
providing future victims of employment discrimination with
the ability to realize the promise of civil rights laws. Funding
would also enable public interest groups’ efforts to address
judicial rulings and laws that dismantle Title VII.
Third, legal empiricists can contribute by closely evaluating the cumulative effect of the Supreme Court’s decisions on
counsel’s decision to represent claimants. Many recent rulings
construe federal statutes. As such, if these rulings dismantle
access to justice, Congress may amend Title VII, attorneys’
fees laws, and procedural rules to reconstruct the private
enforcement scheme. The Court’s decisions comprehensively
affect the system of private enforcement and need to be evaluated cumulatively for their effect on access to justice.
Fourth, greater diversity within the legal profession can
contribute toward resolving the access-to-counsel problem.
If lawyers more broadly represented the backgrounds of
employment discrimination victims, claimants may have
more access to lawyers, through networks and community
organizations, and claimants may feel more comfortable discussing discrimination with lawyers from similar backgrounds. And, if a diverse legal profession channels into a
diverse judiciary, the pluralistic experiences and views of a
diverse judiciary will broaden inclusive perspectives on justice and discrimination (Weinberg & Nielsen, 2011).
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Finally, scientists, legal practitioners, and policy makers
can translate scientifically grounded approaches to managing
diversity into regulated diversity practices that comply with
civil rights laws. Indeed, the French Government, for example, has recently regulated diversity and equality labels that
companies can earn if they maintain diversity practices that
are empirically grounded as effective. These labels are difficult to earn, requiring substantial oversight, evaluations, and
regular renewal. Time will tell whether they increase equal
opportunity. Such an approach would benefit current diversity management, which, although well-intentioned, is often
ineffective and sometimes harmful (Dobbin, 2009).
By regulating diversity practices and separating those that
are empirically based from those that are not, juries and judges
will find it easier to render judgments about whether a “diversity
defense” is credible. For example, if an organization used
empirically validated diversity initiatives, and examined their
organizational data regularly to examine effectiveness and
adjusted policies accordingly, a “diversity defense” may be a
reasonable inference. Indeed, organizations may then be motivated to implement best evidence-based diversity practices, as
the law would recognize their stringent effort to combat bias.
This approach would also recast as less compelling arguments
from organizations that use window-dressing diversity
approaches, making it easier for lawyers to convince juries and
judges to view non-evidence-based approaches more critically.

Conclusion
The United States has witnessed remarkable progress in
access to equal opportunity in the 50 years since Title VII
was signed into law; yet, extensive employment discrimination persists. Women are still paid less than men for the same
work, field experiments in the labor market still reveal discrimination against disadvantaged groups, and disadvantaged groups lag behind advantaged groups in ascending the
ranks within organizations (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013;
Eagly & Carli, 2007). The civil rights promise of Title VII is
still needed. Today, this promise goes unfulfilled for many
victims of employment discrimination. Psychological science can examine one place where the civil rights process
goes awry for discrimination claimants: access to counsel.
By understanding why discrimination claimants, and in particular, minority claimants, experience difficulty accessing
legal counsel, psychological scientists, legal scholars, and
policy makers can work together to enhance access to justice
and improve the potential of civil rights enforcement.
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